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JUDGE RAKOFF, THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, AND
CORPORATE CRIME: LACK OF WILL OR LACK OF CAUSE?
Is Judge Rakoff right? In the wake of the Great Recession, has the Justice
Department neglected its duty to prosecute officers of financial institutions, or
are prosecutorial options insufficient under current law?1
The salient corollary to those questions is whether the financial sector has
re-stabilized to the extent where individuals, if not financial institutions
themselves, might bear a bit of criminal culpability for the collapse. If so, then
as Judge Rakoff puts it, the question that prosecutors must ask is whether “[the
Great Recession was] the result, at least in part, of fraudulent practices, of
dubious mortgages portrayed as sound risks and packaged into ever more
esoteric financial instruments, the fundamental weaknesses of which were
intentionally obscured?”2
Enter Rule 10b-5, a Securities and Exchange Commission regulation that
provides a possible prosecutorial option with which to attack the banks for
willful violations that might include misbranding AAA-rated collateralized
debt obligations (CDOs), or improperly influencing the credit rating agencies.3
However, some claim that sophisticated disclosure provisions included in
investment documents either neutralize 10b-5’s disclosure requirements
regarding the quality of the financial instruments, or qualify the nature of those

1 Judge Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, The Financial
Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Jan. 9, 2014,
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/.
2 Id.
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 states:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
See also 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (a) (2006); U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665−66 (1997) (“To establish a criminal
violation of Rule 10b-5, the Government must prove that a person ‘willfully’ violated the provision.”).
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investments to the extent where the seller sidesteps actual deception.4
Regardless of whether these provisions put parties on actual notice, the
penultimate deals to the 2008 crash spelled ruin for many purchasers of these
instruments. In order to rid the largest banks of their most risky investments,
top-rated CDOs were bought and sold in a high-stakes game of hot potato.
When the CDOs were ultimately downgraded to junk status, the purchasing
institutions were left with worthless investments, and losses into the hundreds
of millions.5 Caveat emptor.
Lanny Breuer, the former head of the Department of Justice’s Criminal
Division, stated in a 2012 interview with Frontline that the Department of
Justice had given Wall Street a “hard look” and investigated suspected crimes
related to the crisis.6 Breuer continued, “when we cannot prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that there was criminal intent, then we have a constitutional
duty not to bring those cases.”7 But intent alone is insufficient; reliance is
required as well. “In a criminal case . . . I have to prove not only that you made
a false statement but that you intended to commit a crime, and also that the
other side of the transaction relied on what you were saying.”8 To Breuer, the
fatal insufficiency was the lack of reliance by sophisticated Wall Street buyers,
their attorneys and accountants. “[T]he reality is, if a Wall Street executive was
involved in a transaction, and on the other side of that transaction was another
Wall Street executive, and they both had sophisticated lawyers and they both
had sophisticated disclosure documents, as much as the conduct is
reprehensible . . . that is not what makes a criminal case.”9
Breuer may have been construing the materiality requirement of Rule 10b5(b)10 to ask whether a reasonable investor thought the disclosures were
important enough to discount the credit rating. This is an amazing idea—
nothing supports this. It is rebuttable on the fraud-on-the-market theory

4

See Breuer interview, infra note 6.
See Matt Taibbi, The People vs. Goldman Sachs, ROLLING STONE, May 11, 2011,
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-people-vs-goldman-sachs-20110511.
6 Lanny Breuer: Financial Fraud Has Not Gone Unpunished, FRONTLINE, PBS.ORG (Jan. 22, 2013),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial-crisis/untouchables/lannybreuer-financial-fraud-has-not-gone-unpunished/.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 See Rule 10b-5(b), supra note 3.
5
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alone.11 Judge Rakoff agrees. In a January 2014 article in the New York Review
of Books, Judge Rakoff takes Breuer to task and succinctly argues that reliance
is nowhere an element in criminal law.12 Although Breuer’s statement seems to
echo the law for private actions brought under Rule 10b-5 and its concomitant
common law requirement that in order for deceptive packaging to constitute
fraud, the buyer had to actually believe the label,13 perhaps he instead meant
that there could be no deceit or manipulation of the market if all the players
knew the CDOs were not really AAA quality. Even if the parties were fully
aware of the risks involved in these transactions, another underlying question
persists. Should disclosure or common knowledge truly mitigate behavior that
severely strained the system and helped cause the recession? The logical next
question is whether individual prosecutions or alternative regulatory
approaches might curb future abuses.
A. The Shift to Deferred Prosecution Agreements and the Frustrating Lack of
Individual Prosecutions
When agents of a financial institution commit criminal acts while acting
within the scope of their duties with intent to benefit the institution, the
institution may be held criminally liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.14 The mere possibility of an indictment can seriously imperil the
firm. For example, government licenses and contracts could be revoked,
accelerated debt repayment provisions might kick in under existing loan
covenants, investors might exit, employees might lose jobs, and the institution
itself might fail. The benchmark horrible is Arthur Andersen.15 A more recent
and perhaps less sympathetic example of another type of business entity that
11 See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (Under the fraud-on-the-market theory, “an
investor’s reliance on any public material misrepresentations . . . may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b5 action.”).
12 See Rakoff, supra note 2.
13 See, e.g., Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011) (explaining that
under Rule 10b-5, reliance is an element of a private action).
14 See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice for
Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Attorneys on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations
(Jan.
20,
2003),
available
at:
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv
_dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Thompson Memo].
15 See generally Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen
Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107 (2006) (describing the prosecution of Arthur Andersen and his
accounting firm in the wake of the Enron scandal). See also Peter Spivak & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New
Regulators’: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements , 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 165−66 (2008)
[hereinafter The New Regulators].
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was indicted for systemic violations, S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P., has been
rebranded and reduced to trading one private account, that of its founder,
Steven A. Cohen.16
In light of these dangers, and even prior to the recession, deferred or nonprosecution agreements have become a favored tool among prosecutors.17
These agreements allow corporations to avoid an indictment in return for the
payment of fines, the institution of compliance procedures and monitors, and
enhanced cooperation with the Justice Department.18 This new norm posits a
role for the Department of Justice where they essentially become the new
regulators for corporate behavior.19 The threat of indictment, which would
cause the loss of government licenses and permits, coupled with the
compliance strictures of these agreements, which generally require the entity to
“enact substantial internal reforms” in return for the dismissal of charges,
allows the government to reform corporate governance.20 This is in contrast to
the retroactive effects of a criminal prosecution and its associated punishment
and deterrence elements.
Though the use of these agreements to reform corporate governance has
grown in popularity, many contain provisions designed to advance the
traditional goal of “effectively [helping] prosecutors build a case against
individual employees.”21 Indeed, the continuing stance of the Justice
Department is that individual prosecutions can effect systemic changes in
behavior that carry great social good.22 Larry Thompson, the former United
States Deputy Attorney General, mandated that United States Attorneys always
assess the merits of corporate prosecution while emphasizing that in the
majority of cases individual prosecutions should also be pursued:
16 See Matthew Goldstein, SAC Capital, Meet Point72 Asset Management, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, April
7, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/sac-capital-meet-point72-asset-management/; see also Ben
Protess & Alexandra Stevenson, After Scandal, SAC Capital Begins to Fade to Black, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK,
Feb. 2, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/02/after-scandal-sac-capital-begins-to-fade-to-black/.
17 See the New Regulators, supra note 9, at 159; David M. Uhlmann, Prosecution Deferred, Justice
Denied, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 13, 2013) (“From 2010 to 2012, the [DOJ’s criminal] division reached twice as
many deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements with corporations as there were plea agreements”),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/14/opinion/prosecution-deferred-justice-denied.html?_r=0
(“From 2010 to 2012, the [DOJ’s criminal] division reached twice as many deferred prosecution and
nonprosecution agreements with corporations as there were plea agreements”).
18 David M. Uhlmann Op-Ed., Prosecution Deferred, Justice Denied, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Dec. 13,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/14/opinion/prosecution-deferred-justice-denied.html.
19 See the New Regulators, supra note 9,. at 161.
20 Id. at 160.
21 Id.
22 See Thompson Memo, supra note 12.
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Charging a corporation, however, does not mean that individual
directors, officers, employees, or shareholders should not also be
charged. Prosecution of a corporation is not a substitute for the
prosecution of criminally culpable individuals within or without the
corporation. Because a corporation can act only through individuals,
imposition of individual criminal liability may provide the strongest
deterrent against future corporate wrongdoing. Only rarely should
provable individual culpability not be pursued, even in the face of
offers of corporate guilty pleas.23

However, even what appear to be more straightforward cases of neglect,
recklessness, or even intentional wrongdoing at financial institutions may only
infrequently lead to prosecution of individuals. For example, Georgia led the
nation in failed banks from 2008–2013, with almost ninety banks having gone
under in this period.24 Mortgage fraud, aggravated by aggressive lending
practices and problematic construction loans,25 may have led to over-leverage
on sub-prime mortgages and contributed to some of these failures.26
The United States Attorneys’ Office for the Northern District of Georgia
has identified the prosecution of mortgage fraud as one of its top priorities.27
Yet even with a thorough internal review of failed regional banks, there have
only been a handful of successful prosecutions.28 One assistant United States
attorney proffered that while all bank failures in Georgia are investigated,
many are turned down due to insufficient evidence of misrepresentation, fraud,
or other violations of law. Absent a “smoking gun,” proving the intent
necessary for acts to constitute fraud beyond a reasonable doubt is difficult.

23

Id. (emphasis added).
See
Failed
Bank
List,
FED.
DEPOSIT
INS.
CORP.,
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
25 See, e.g., Todd, infra note 28.
26 See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed: Georgia On My Mind, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/12/opinion/12krugman.html. See also, e.g., Ben Steverman, Get Ready for
BUSINESSWEEK,
Sept.
14,
2009,
More
Bank
Failures,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/sep2009/pi20090914_866281.htm.
27 See
Divisions,U.S.
ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE
FOR
THE
N.
DIST.
OF
GA.,
http://www.justice.gov/usao/gan/divisions/criminal.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2014) (“The nation’s financial
crisis was caused in part by corrupt bank insiders and major borrowers whose crimes contributed to the failures
or bailouts of financial institutions previously believed to be secure. Unfortunately Georgia leads the nation in
bank failures, with numerous banks having been shut down by the FDIC since the crisis began. Attacking this
ongoing problem through the aggressive prosecution of bank fraud is one of our district’s high priorities.”).
28 See, e.g., Sarah Todd, Former CEO of Failed Ga. Bank Pleads Guilty in Fraud Case, AMERICAN
BANKER, Nov. 13, 2013, http://www.americanbanker.com/people/former-ceo-of-failed-ga-bank-pleads-guiltyin-fraud-case-1063642-1.html?zkPrintable=true.
24
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B. Attempts at Quasi-Strict Liability and Steps Forward
Congress has noticed the obstacles to the successful prosecution of bank
fraud, and there have been attempts to impose quasi-strict liability. However,
laws that theoretically box in corporate officers by requiring them to sign-off
on the veracity of financial statements and to attest to corporate compliance
have been eviscerated, either in practice or on the cutting block of regulatory
compromise. As an example of the former, the certification requirements of
Sarbanes-Oxley have been all but completely neutered by the corporate
practice of sub-certification—where lower-level employees certify financial
statements before the top officers sign off on them, thus undermining proof of
the element of knowledge.29 Although respondeat superior might still lead to
corporate liability in this scenario, sub-certification subverts individual liability
under Sarbanes-Oxley. As an example of the latter, regulators involved with
writing final regulations enforcing the Volcker Rule, the centerpiece of the
Dodd-Frank legislation, disagreed on whether to force top officers to attest to
corporate compliance with the Rule’s provisions.30 Under the current version
of the rule, those officers are required only to attest that the bank “has in place
processes to establish, maintain, enforce, review, test and modify” compliance
with the Rule.31
Still, some in Congress, including Senators Carl Levin and Elizabeth
Warren, continue to attempt to curb this behavior through aggressive
investigations, potentially incriminating reports,32 and calls for prosecutors to
prosecute larger financial institutions in addition to smaller banks.33 However,
29 See Alison Frankel, Sarbane-Oxley’s Lost Promise, THOMSON REUTERS,July 27, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/27/us-financial-sarbox-idUSBRE86Q1BY20120727.
30 See Ben Protess & Peter Eavis, At the Finish Line on the Volcker Rule, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Dec.
10, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/10/regulators-vote-to-approve-volcker-rule/ [hereinafter At the
Finish Line].
31 Text
of
the
Final
Common
Rules,
FEDERALRESERVE.GOV,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20131210a1.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2014)
(describing final rules implementing the Volcker Rule).
32 See United States Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse at
624 (April 13, 2011) (commonly referred to as the “Levin-Coburn Report”) (reporting on the Subcommittee’s
investigation into the origins of the 2008 financial crisis and stating that “Goldman CEO Lloyd Blankfein said
publicly about the firm’s securities: ‘If we believed it would fail . . . the security wouldn’t work, we would not
sell it. But Goldman marketed the Anderson and Timberwolf securities to clients knowing that each CDO had
poor quality assets that were continually losing value.”).
33 See Mollie Reilly, Elizabeth Warren Takes on Eric Holder’s ‘Too Big to Jail’ Statement, THE
HUFFINGTON POST, March 6, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/06/elizabeth-warren-ericholder_n_2823618.html.
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Congress has stopped short of enacting new laws that might place bank
executives under anything approaching strict criminal liability. On the civil
liability front, despite the recent issuance of regulations implementing the
Volcker Rule,34 there are lingering concerns that Dodd-Frank may be
insufficient to stem aggressively risky investments by the banks.35 Although
those developments will continue to play out over the next few years, it seems
clear that for the moment, the plenary Congress has opted to steward the
banking ship’s treasury, but not its captains’ course.
MICHAEL A. WISEMAN∗

34

See At the Finish Line, supra note 26.
See William Greider, Don’t Get Too Excited About the Volcker Rule, THE NATION, Dec. 12, 2013,
http://www.thenation.com/blog/177574/dont-get-too-excited-about-volcker-rule#. But see Mike Konczal,
There are Six Big Arguments Against the Volcker Rule. Here’s Why They’re Wrong., WASH. POST, Dec. 10,
2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/12/10/there-are-six-main-arguments-againstthe-volcker-rule-heres-why-theyre-wrong/ (arguing the Volcker Rule is “important and worth strengthening”).
∗ Emory University School of Law, J.D. with Honors, 2014; E-Content Specialist, Managing Editor,
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